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NARRATIVE FICTION BEFORE 1850:  
INSTANCES OF REFUTATION FOR POETIC THEORIES OF NARRATION?1 
 
 
Sylvie PATRON 
University of Paris Diderot-Paris 7 
 
 
1. In “Fiction, Pretense, and Narration”, an article which has often 
been cited since its publication on the occasion of the French edition of 
Käte Hamburger‟s Die Logik der Dichtung (The Logic of Literature),2 Jean-
Marie Schaeffer focuses on Hamburger‟s narrative theory, which he 
considers to be incompatible with narratology, or at least with certain 
aspects of narratology. In the last part of his article, he offers the 
following argument: 
 
[...] contrary to what Hamburger thinks, the ideal model that emerges from 
her analyses is not that of fictional narrative in the third person, but a much 
more specific model  that of heterodiegetic narrative with internal 
focalization, that is, with a narrator who recounts a story from which he is 
absent while adopting the perspective of his characters or character. 
Indeed, the definition of a fictional narrative as a Here and Now 
presentation of characters and their inner life only seems to be realizable 
via strict internal focalization, any element of external focalization resulting 
fatally in a split of the narrative universe (a split that Hamburger's theory 
does not recognize). In pure form, this model of narrative (which, as a 
global model, scarcely dates back to before the second half of the 
nineteenth century) seems quite distant in fact from serious narrative: the 
idea that description of the interior life of a third person is prohibited in 
serious narrative seems unassailable at first glance. (160) 
 
I will single out one point only from this passage (notably leaving to 
one side the issue of whether the description of the inner life of a third 
person is prohibited in serious narrative or not).3 Hamburger put forward 
a theory which claimed to be a general theory of fictional narrative. 
According to Schaeffer, Hamburger‟s theory would not account for fictional 
narratives before 1850; in other words, the latter would refute it, or would 
at least refute some of its essential propositions. In this article I would like 
to examine the legitimacy of his assertion, in the case not only of 
Hamburger‟s theory, but also of theories by S.-Y. Kuroda and Ann 
Banfield, which I propose, following the latter two theorists, to call “poetic 
theories of narration”.4 
As is clear from the passage quoted, like many other narratologists, 
Schaeffer is less interested in what Hamburger “thinks” or expresses 
explicitly, than in what “emerges” or is supposed to emerge from her 
analyses, which she neither thought nor expressed. However, it should be 
noted that not all narratologists have the same view of the model 
emerging from Hamburger‟s analyses. Dorrit Cohn writes, for example, 
that: “[...] starting out from textual observations, [Hamburger] 
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demonstrates that certain language patterns are unique to fiction, and 
dependent on the presence of fictional minds within the text” (1978: 7) 
and also that:  
 
[...] where Hamburger‟s theory differs from all of these typologies 
[Norman Friedman‟s, Franz Stanzel‟s, Gérard Genette‟s, etc.] is that for her, 
psychic omniscience is not a narrative type or mode or device or technique, 
but the pivotal structural norm that rules the realm of third-person fiction 
and that is logically ruled out in all other discursive realms. (1999: 25) 
 
For Cohn, the model which emerges from Hamburger‟s analyses is 
not that of “heterodiegetic narrative with internal focalization", but that of 
the kind of narrative which is traditionally termed “omniscient”, because it 
contains information unavailable to individuals with ordinary cognitive 
abilities (on the other hand, Cohn is right to say that, for Hamburger, the 
concept of psychic omniscience is not simply an issue of taxonomy). 
It should also be noted that Schaeffer (1998: 162) is a relativist 
when it comes to Hamburger‟s theory (“this model of narrative [...] 
scarcely dates back to before the second half of the nineteenth century” 
and, later, “Once we look further than the historical field that the author 
of The Logic of Literature privileges [...] the phenomena of fictionalization 
are far from being so omnipresent as her theory leaves it understood to 
be”).5 By contrast, he is hardly a relativist in his use of narratological 
categories: the opposition between “homodiegetic” and “heterodiegetic” 
narrative (ib. 163, 166), which supports the narratorial theory of 
narrative, in other words, the theory of a narrator in all narrative;6 
“focalization” (ib. 167), defined as “the question of knowing from what 
viewpoint events are narrated” (despite the fact that narratology also use 
the term “focalization” to refer to “non-focalization” or the absence of 
point of view); the opposition between “internal focalization” and “external 
focalization”. It is as though it were taken for granted that in any 
narrative with point of view, “a narrator [...] recounts a story from which 
he is absent while adopting the perspective of his characters or character” 
and that “any element of external focalization result[s] fatally in a split of 
the narrative universe”. Yet Schaeffer may be considered, particularly with 
the benefit of hindsight, to be too ready to take for granted an issue which 
in fact begs further investigation. 
The two points I have just cited make it possible to explain, in part, 
why Schaeffer pays only scant attention to the law which, according to 
Hamburger (83), governs third-person fictional narrative, to wit the 
disappearance of the author as the point of origin of the referential values 
and anchors of deixis (“I-Origo” in Hamburger‟s terminology), correlative 
with the possibility of representing “the I-originarity (or subjectivity) of a 
third-person qua third-person”. Schaeffer (1998: 150) quotes 
Hamburger‟s famous statement regarding the use of verbs expressing 
internal processes in the third person (“She thus concludes that „Epic 
fiction is the sole epistemological instance where the I-originarity (or 
subjectivity) of a third-person qua third person can be portrayed‟”); he 
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raises the issue on several occasions with reference to temporal and 
spatial deixis and to the epic preterit. However, he does not give the 
proposition any real theoretical status and, in particular, he does not 
discuss it in the final part of his article, which is devoted to a comparison 
between Hamburger‟s narrative theory and narratology. To my mind, by 
contrast, the proposition is at the heart of Hamburger‟s theory as well as 
Kuroda‟s and Banfield‟s. It is fundamental to the comparison which should 
be made between poetic theories of narration and narratology. 
 
2. I will now briefly sketch a version of narratological theory in order 
to determine the extent to which Hamburger‟s, Kuroda‟s and Banfield‟s 
theories are compatible or incompatible with it.7 Narratology can be 
summarized by the following propositions: 
(i) In any narrative, the story (the series of events told in the 
narrative) can be distinguished from the narrative itself (the spoken or 
written discourse which recounts the events). This distinction traditionally 
relies on the existence of discordances between the chronological order of 
the recounted events and the order of their disposition in the narrative. 
(ii) The narrative is always recounted by somebody addressing 
somebody else (even in the case of written narrative: here, “recounted” 
signifies “produced in an oral or written verbal form”): this is narrating in 
Genette‟s terminology. 
(iii) In the case of fictional narrative, the story and the narrating (and 
thus the narrator and the narratee) are fictional. More precisely, a fictional 
act of narrating duplicates the author‟s real act, which narratology does 
not analyse, although without it there would simply be no narrative.8 The 
fictional narrator recounts a series of events, with which he or she is 
familiar before recounting them, to the fictional narratee. It is the narrator 
who makes use of the categories of time (order, duration, frequency), 
mood and voice in Genettian narratology. It is the narrator who is 
responsible for the selection and presentation (sometimes termed 
“focalization”, cf. Bal 1997: 8 et passim) of narrative information in other 
narratologies. 
(iv) Genette distinguishes between homodiegetic fictional narratives 
(whose narrator is present as a character in the story he or she recounts) 
and heterodiegetic fictional narratives (where the narrator is absent from 
the story recounted). However, this distinction is only a secondary 
distinction within the category of fictional narrative, defined as the 
discourse of a fictional narrator. Other narratologists make an equivalent 
distinction between fictional narratives narrated by an internal narrator or 
an external narrator (cf. Chatman 155, 158, 170 and Stanzel 4-5 et 
passim) and by an external narrator or a narrator-character (cf. Bal 1997: 
22 et passim, Chatman 234 and Stanzel 90). 
(v) However, Genette makes no distinction between heterodiegetic 
fictional narratives in which the narrator refers to himself or herself using 
a first-person pronoun and those in which the narrator never refers to 
himself or herself and is not only absent as a character in the story 
recounted, but totally invisible in the narrative.9  
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(vi) These propositions are not linked to any given narrative tradition. 
In any given tradition, individual author‟s work or any particular narrative, 
the importance given to particular elements of time, mood or voice may 
vary; by contrast, the story, the narrative and the narrating, the fictional 
nature of the story and its narrating in fictional narrative, as well as the 
distribution of fictional narratives into the categories of homodiegesis or 
heterodiegesis are all invariable. 
(vii) The fact that the fictional narrator makes use of the categories of 
time, mood and voice, or the fact that the narrator is homodiegetic in 
certain fictional narratives and heterodiegetic in others, or again, that 
certain heterodiegetic narrators never refer to themselves, are not 
responsible for any special “semantic effects” which might differ from the 
contents and relations determined in (i) and (ii) and play a role in the 
interpretation of a particular fictional narrative. On this point, Genette‟s 
narratology differs from other narratologies which are more concerned 
with the issue of interpretation.10 
(viii) Narratology claims a similarity to John Searle‟s theory of 
fictional discourse (cf. Ryan 1981: 518-19, Genette 1993: 70-71 and 
Schaeffer 1994: 53 among others). It sees as equivalent Searle‟s 
proposition that “the author of a work of fiction pretends to perform a 
series of illocutionary acts of assertion” and the proposition which can be 
deduced from (iii), that “the fictional narrator performs illocutionary acts 
of assertion”. In doing so, it extends the description reserved by Searle 
for the first-person fictional narrative, or a version of it, to all fictional 
narratives. I have tried elsewhere to show that this extension is abusive 
and indeed contradictory from Searle‟s perspective (cf. Patron 2009: 100-
106, 123-25, 126-27, 130-33).  
This presentation could give rise to long commentaries on the origins 
of such propositions, their formulation, which can vary from one author to 
another (certain propositions may even remain implicit) and on their 
retention by the school of narratology which is now called “post-
classical”.11 I will simply offer two comments.  
The theory (i)-(viii) is a minimal, non-linguistic version of 
narratological theory. More content might be afforded to the theory 
through interpreting the propositions (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) from a 
linguistic point of view. Insofar as it is a narratorial theory of narrative, 
narratology implies that any sentence of a narrative is considered as a 
message communicated by a narrator, whether real or fictional, to its 
receiver or narratee, whether real or fictional (the issue of knowing 
precisely what “fictional” means will be left to one side for the time being). 
For fictional narratives, one could speak in terms of double communication 
or communication on two levels, the first one real, the second fictional, by 
forming the hypothesis of a relation between the two levels similar to 
quoting direct speech without introduction or comment clause; however, 
narratology does not analyse the first level, so that the fictional level 
takes the place of the two levels by itself. The distinction between first-
person fictional narratives (homodiegetic narratives, in Genette‟s 
terminology) and third-person fictional narratives (heterodiegetic 
  
 
5 
narratives) has no pertinence within this communicational framework: any 
sentence in a fictional narrative is considered as a message which is 
communicated either by a character who refers to himself or herself as I, 
or by a speaker who can never refer to himself or herself, but is 
nevertheless still a first person who is not actual but can be actualized as 
such.  
As I have just pointed out, the theory from (i) to (viii) contains a 
blind spot. Narratology affirms that, in fictional narrative, the narrator and 
the narratee are fictional, yet it has no concept of fictionality. It follows 
quite simply from its affirmations that it applies a double standard, one 
holding for the narrator of first-person fictional narratives, as well as the 
other characters, places, etc. in the fiction which are often termed 
“fictional entities” and are considered to have the same properties as 
entities in the real world, and another holding for the narrator of third-
person fictional narratives (I am thinking in particular of those in which 
the narrator never refers to himself and is totally invisible and absent 
from his narrative). If the first narrator is undoubtedly fictional, the 
second might more legitimately be termed “postulated” (in the theoretical 
sense) or simply “theoretical”.12 
 
3. I shall now turn to poetic theories of narration. It is much more 
difficult to present an acceptable version of these theories in a succinct 
manner than it is for narratology. It is also difficult to rectify the 
misreadings and misrepresentations to which they have given rise and 
potentially provide more content to elements which remain undetermined, 
without being able to discuss them at length (cf. Patron 2009: ch. 7-9). I 
shall limit myself to emphasizing three aspects: their calling into question 
of the idea of communication; their refutation of the narratorial hypothesis 
in certain precise cases and their reinterpretation of an old theory in new 
theories. 
3.1. For the representatives of poetic theories of narration (precisely, 
Kuroda and Banfield), there is nothing obvious in the idea that the relation 
between author and reader in fictional narrative is one of communication 
in any essential or interesting sense of the term “communication”. The 
adjectives “essential” and “interesting” are Noam Chomsky‟s (56, 57), 
quoted by Kuroda (1980: 69).13 In order to speak of communication in an 
interesting manner, it is necessary to be able to rely on a linguistic and, 
potentially, a pragmatic analysis of that which pertains to communication, 
as opposed to that which can be understood not to pertain to it. Neither is 
there anything obvious in the idea that there is a fictional 
communicational relationship in all fictional narratives which implies a 
fictional narrator and narratee (Kuroda and Banfield take the same 
position as Hamburger here). 
Based on certain characteristics of the Japanese language (usage of 
the adjectival form of adjective/verb pair for expressing feeling, usage of 
the word zibun in certain structures), Kuroda‟s linguistic analyses 
establish:  
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(i) homogeneity between sentences in ordinary communication and 
sentences in first-person fictional narrative,14 as well as sentences in 
certain third-person fictional narratives which could be seen as narrated 
by a narrator who never refers to himself or herself (examples might be 
“neutral” or “behaviourist” narratives such as certain short stories by 
Hemingway);15 
(ii) heterogeneity, by contrast, between sentences in ordinary 
communication and certain sentences in certain third-person fictional 
narratives (third-person fictional narratives with the representation of the 
“point of view” of one or several characters: Joyce‟s Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man or Woolf‟s To the Lighthouse, for example).16 
Sentences which use the adjectival form of the adjective/verb pair for 
expressing feeling (kanasii instead of kanasigaru [“sad”]) or the word 
zibun (“self”) for representing “point of view” or the “lived experience” 
(Erlebnis) of one or more characters in the third person cannot be 
described adequately within the framework of the communicational theory 
of linguistic performance which is based on the concepts of speaker and 
receiver. On the one hand, Kuroda states that: 
 
[t]he role of the writer of a non-first-person story is to assemble (in 
fact, create) such information and set it in order. This is in no way 
identifiable with the role of the “speaker” in the paradigm of linguistic 
performance [...]. (1973: 382-3) 
 
On the other hand, he uses precise linguistic tests (insertion of yo at 
the end of the segment, rewriting of the sentence in the first person), to 
show that such sentences cannot be seen to be narrated by a fictional 
narrator adopting the viewpoint of one or more characters or taking on 
the task of presenting their Erlebnis.  
Kuroda then refers to Benveniste on histoire and discours, 
Hamburger on fiktionales Erzählen and Banfield on free indirect discourse 
(represented speech and thought) to fuel his critique of communicational 
theories of narrative. He formulates Genette‟s revision of Benveniste‟s 
opposition between histoire and discours very clearly (Kuroda 1976: 116, 
125, 138).17 He also puts forward a new theory of linguistic performance 
to replace communicational theory and provide access to a unified 
conception of narrative and discourse in general. His theory is based on 
the identification and characterization of the objective function, as he puts 
it, of the sentence, as distinct from its communicative function. The 
distinction points to the fact that any sentence which has been created as 
a real entity in the world calls up a meaning in the mind of the person 
hearing or reading it — and does so whether the sentence is materialized 
in a situation of communication or not. Kuroda writes, for example, about 
the sentence containing zibun:  
 
Reading this sentence we obtain an image or knowledge of an event, 
but we do not assume the existence of any consciousness which has judged 
the occurrence of this event and communicated it to someone. Simply the 
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sentence creates in us the image or knowledge of the event. This and this 
much is the function of the sentence vis-à-vis the reader. (1976: 134) 
 
Based on the comparison between the effects produced by speech 
acts like orders or information (as distinct from assertions) on an outside 
listener and on the speaker‟s addressee in the strict sense, Kuroda‟s 
pragmatic analyses lead to the identification and characterization of three 
linguistic functions: the objective function (which is the most essential, in 
the sense that it is an essential component of the second and third 
functions); the objectifying function which consists, for a speaker, in 
objectifying the content of his mind (this is an essential component in the 
third function) and the communicative function which consists, for a 
speaker, in communicating the objectified content to the addressee (this it 
the least essential function in the sense that it presupposes the others but 
is not presupposed by them). A speech act is only an act of 
communication if the communicative function is activated. Kuroda 
indicates in passing that in Japanese, the communicative function can be 
recognized by specific formal traits (stylistic traits, terms and honorific 
constructions). He comes to the conclusion that the crucial characteristic 
of “the communicational theory of narration” (the quotation marks are in 
his text) is more closely related in the end to the objectifying function 
than the communicative one:  
 
The core of the theory is the assumed existence of a narrating agent. 
A narrative is assumed to be a product of the objectifying act of the 
narrator. Opinions concerning the role of the audience or the reader can 
vary. (1979: 10-11)  
 
To this he opposes his own poetic theory of narration:  
 
The supposition of a narrator who objectifies the content of his 
consciousness in the form of a narrative is quite unnatural, especially in 
certain types of modern fiction where the inner experiences of multiple 
protagonists are simultaneously depicted. The function of language in such 
fiction cannot be accounted for in terms of the communicative or 
objectifying function. I have thus identified the function that makes such 
use of language possible as the objective function of language, the function 
such that an attentive consciousness cannot fail to respond to objectively 
materialized sentences and make out of them whatever sense can be 
constructed from them, without any necessity of recognizing or 
hypothesizing the existence behind those sentences of a consciousness 
objectifying what it perceives or judges. (ib. 11) 
 
Banfield‟s linguistic analyses, to which I shall return in the next 
section, make use of Kuroda‟s and further them on a certain number of 
points: bringing the axiomatic nature of communication in the 
communicational theory of narration into question; affirming the necessity 
of defining communication in rigorous linguistic terms; defining linguistic 
subjectivity (this definition is based on a comparison between direct 
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discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse, or represented 
speech and thought, which enables the formal marks of the expression of 
subjectivity and those of communication to be isolated); introducing, 
alongside the idea of the speaker, the new idea of the subject of 
consciousness or SELF to designate the origin of deixis and subjectivity; 
characterization of sentences in third-person free indirect discourse as 
sentences which are not governed by the framework structured by the 
relation of communication between an I and a you.  
Reflection on the role of writing can also be found in Banfield‟s work, 
in the sense of written linguistic realization (as distinct from the 
transcription of oral language) in the production and reception of fictional 
narratives. In Banfield‟s theory, writing is the extra-linguistic factor which 
enables certain potentialities of language to be actualized in performance. 
 
3.2. This section is devoted to the refutation of the narratorial 
hypothesis in several specific cases. Banfield offers both the most 
powerful counter-examples and the most refined theory enabling 
explanation both of counter-examples to the initial hypothesis and of the 
facts it explained. I shall simply recall the following points: 
(i) the principles she formulated for free indirect discourse 
(represented speech and thought): the principle of the uniqueness of the 
subject of consciousness, according to which “[f]or every node E, there is 
at most one referent, called the „subject of consciousness‟ or SELF, to 
whom all expressive elements are attributed”18 (this principle is a 
reformulation of the “one expression/one speaker” principle for direct and 
indirect discourse); the principle of the priority of the speaker, according 
to which “[i]f there is an I, I is coreferential with the SELF” (Banfield 
1982: 93). 
(ii) the test enabling these principles to be justified: if an I is added 
to a sentence of third-person free indirect discourse, it becomes clear that 
it is no longer possible to attribute expressive elements and constructions 
to a subject other than the referent of the I (in other words, it is no longer 
possible to consider them as sentences of third-person free indirect 
discourse): 
 
Where were her paints, she wondered? Her paints, yes. (Virginia Woolf, To 
the Lighthouse 168.) 
 
Where were my paints, *she wondered? My paints, yes.19 
 
As Banfield puts it: 
 
Since no first person may appear in represented speech and thought 
except one interpretable as the E‟s SELF and since that first person must 
also appear in any parenthetical attached to the represented E, this means 
that represented Es cannot be simultaneously attributed to a covert or 
„effaced‟ narrator. (Banfield 1982: 97)20 
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Note that in Banfield‟s view, if sentences of free indirect discourse do 
not necessarily have a narrator, they do have an author who is 
responsible for their existence as real entities in the world as well as their 
disposition and role within the text. 
The same test could be used and the same reasoning put forward in 
relation to sentences which, according to Banfield, represent subjectless 
subjectivity: 
 
The sun had now sunk lower in the sky. (Virginia Woolf, The Waves 129)
21 
 
It is clear that these sentences cannot be attributed to a covert or 
effaced narrator (or one revealed indirectly by the use of the adverb 
“now”) without losing their essential characteristics: the combined 
occurrence of “now” and a past tense; the absence of any subject of 
consciousness to whom the “now” might be attributed.  
 
3.3. This section concerns the question of the reinterpretation of a old 
theory within new theories. I shall only deal with Hamburger‟s theory, but 
my comments can be extrapolated to Kuroda‟s and Banfield‟s. 
The conceptualization of the difference between third-person fictional 
narrative, in which the author himself recounts the story and first-person 
fictional narrative (in the form of an embedded narrative22), in which a 
character fictionally recounts the story, dates back to Aristotle. The 
concept of a narrator distinct from the author made its appearance much 
later, in the early 19th century, in the first descriptions of first-person 
fictional narrative without embedding (fictional memoirs or first-person 
novels in the proper sense).23 The issues it encapsulates are the following: 
an I which does not belong to the author but to a fictional character; a 
pact of truthfulness within the fiction (the narrator speaks of the past in a 
truthful manner, which does not mean that he cannot lie or deform the 
truth, but simply that he does not relate a fictional narrative); restriction 
of narrative information to knowledge open to the I and to his memory; 
potentially a restriction of thought and style proper to the ability of the I; 
some degree of contrast in terms of their age, social status, general 
knowledge and rational ability between the narrated I in the story and the 
I narrating the story.  
In Hamburger‟s theory, the following reappear: 
— the difference between third-person fictional narrative, considered 
as a general or standard case and first-person fictional narrative, 
considered as a particular case;24 
— the traditional view of the narrator reserved for first-person 
fictional narrative: Hamburger claims that “only in cases where the 
narrative poet actually does „create‟ a narrator, namely the first-person 
narrator of the first-person narrative, can one speak of the latter as a 
(fictive) narrator” (140);25 she thus rejects the Stanzelian view of the 
(fictitious or fictional) narrator, extending to third-person fictional 
narratives with intrusions such as “I”, “we”, “our hero” and, from there, to 
all third-person fictional narratives;26  
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— the issues implied by the traditional concept of the narrator, in 
particular the issue of the narrator belonging to the fictional world and the 
restriction of information to knowledge (of the inner life of the other 
characters) and memory available to the narrator. 
By contrast, Hamburger is the first theoretician to conceptualize: 
— the fact that the author of a third-person fictional narrative does 
not narrate in the same way as the author of a factual narrative or the 
narrator of a first-person fictional narrative within the fiction: he or she 
appears to narrate events which exist prior to the act of narration (which 
Hamburger expresses by provisionally retaining the term of “narrator”) 
(cf. 62 et sq.),27 but in reality, he or she “creates” such events, or makes 
them exist fictionally (which Hamburger conceptualizes in terms of 
“functional correspondence” between the narration and that which is 
narrated (cf. 136), while the narrator of a first-person fictional narrative 
“does not „engender‟ that which he narrates, but narrates about it in the 
same manner as in every reality statement [...]” (317) (which Hamburger 
conceptualizes in terms of “feigned reality statements”) (cf. 311, 313 et 
sq.); 
— the fact that the author of a third-person fictional narrative 
disappears as the point of origin for referential values and deictic markers 
(real “I-Origo”), which allows the apparition of “fictive I-Origines” whose 
“I-originarity (or subjectivity)” may be developed to a greater or lesser 
degree (cf. 73 and 83),28 while the narrator of a first-person fictional 
narrative “is always present” as I-Origo of the narrative and “never 
disappears, which [...] would result in the emergence of fictive I-origines 
in its place” (315);29 
— the fact that the third-person fictional narrative bears linguistic and 
textual signs of this appearance/disappearance: verbs describing inner 
processes in the third person, monologue and free indirect discourse, past 
tenses combined with present and future deictic adverbs, situational verbs 
combined with indications of date and long passages of dialogue (the list 
should not be considered exhaustive); in principle, such signs should not 
be used in first-person fictional narratives; in practice, they are often 
found combined with signs of first-person narration (few authors renounce 
long passages of dialogue, for example) (cf. 332, 337); 
— the fact that third-person fictional narrative is a narrative with no 
narrator, since the hypothesis of an omniscient narrator as a corollary to 
that of a fictional narrator in third-person fictional narratives is so vague 
and devoid of independent justification that it can only be viewed as a 
pseudo-hypothesis (cf. 141).30 
I have two final comments to make. 
Hamburger‟s theory does not deny those aspects of fictional narrative 
which were examined by narratology under the category of time (order, 
duration, frequency).31 However, her theory, like those of Kuroda and 
Banfield, attributes the use of such categories, or techniques of 
composition, not to the narrator, but to the author — as was current 
before Genette and the advent of narratology. Their theories distinguish 
elements pertaining to fictional content (characters, places, etc. and the 
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narrator if there is one) from the means put to work in constructing the 
fiction (language, style, techniques of composition).32  
Searle‟s and Hamburger‟s theories are not fundamentally 
incompatible.33 Notably, they share elements stemming from the 
traditional view: the difference between third-person fictional narrative 
and first-person fictional narrative, the view of the narrator, etc. They also 
share a study of how reference works in fictional narrative (in Speech 
Acts, Searle (1969: 78) even evokes sentences which cannot be written or 
said: “Sherlock Holmes is coming to my house for dinner tonight”, for the 
reference to “my house” puts us back in real world talk). It is true that 
Searle claims categorically that “[t]here is no textual property, syntactical 
or semantic, that will identify a text as a work of fiction” (1979: 65). But 
the necessary and sufficient properties for identifying a text as a work of 
fiction (Searle) should be distinguished from signs pointing to the fictional 
character of the existence of that which is narrated (Hamburger).34 
Besides, if Searle had paid closer attention and taken his reading further, 
he would have found numerous signs of fictionality in Hamburger‟s sense 
in his chosen example of a fictional work (Iris Murdoch‟s The Red and the 
Green), some of which could have been considered sufficient to identify 
the text as a work of fiction (cf. Wildekamp et al. 1980: notably 559-561, 
565). As for Hamburger‟s theory, she does not deny that many sentences 
or passages in fictional narratives are formally identical to those found in 
either oral or written factual narratives.35 
 
4. I mentioned at the outset that Hamburger put forward a theory 
which claimed to be a general theory of fictional narrative. However, her 
generalizing aim is not achieved in the same way in all the domains she 
examines. In the case of signs of fictionality, for example, globally 
speaking the theory attains a certain degree of generality — Hamburger 
does not claim that all the signs discovered and explained are found in all 
third-person fictional narratives, whatever their genre, period or the 
author under consideration.36 By contrast, Hamburger does put forward a 
theory of the history of third-person fictional narratives (essentially 
incarnated in the novel as a genre), which is that of the ever greater 
autonomy in the presentation of characters in relation to that which a real 
subject could say or write of people belonging to a shared reality (this is 
what she understands by forming characters “as fictive persons or 
subjects”) (59). She writes, for example:  
 
We already have pointed out on several occasions that in the course of 
the nineteenth century the techniques of fictionalization had become more 
and more refined, the presentation of the psychic life came increasingly 
more to employ the devices of directly subjectifying the characters. That is 
the fictive I-originarity of the figures became more and more explicitly 
developed, culminating in the bold methods of Joyce. (168) 
 
In the same way, Kuroda‟s and Banfield‟s theories aim to be theories 
of fictional narrative and not of a given corpus of fictional narratives, even 
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if this may appear less obvious than in Hamburger's case. Remember the 
sentence from Kuroda (1979:11) quoted above:  
 
The supposition of a narrator who objectifies the content of his 
consciousness in the form of a narrative is quite unnatural, especially in 
certain types of modern fiction where the inner experiences of multiple 
protagonists are simultaneously depicted. (my italics) 
 
I do not have time to present the “deictic shift theory” developed by 
a group of researchers in cognitive science at the State University of New 
York at Buffalo, which forms an attempt at generalization, as well as an 
empirical validation, of poetic theories of narration (cf. Duchan et al., 
eds.: notably ch. 1, 2 and 6). 
Is it the case that fictional narratives prior to 1850 are not accounted 
for by poetic theories of narration — in other words, that they refute 
them, or at least refute some of their essential propositions? For this to be 
demonstrated, it would first need to be shown that a particular fictional 
narrative prior to 1850, chosen for a particular emblematic reason, formed 
an authentic counter-example to the theories or to some of their essential 
propositions. Next, multiple analyses of as wide and varied a range as 
possible of pre-1850 fictional narratives would need to be carried out. 
Finally, as part of the comparison between narratology and poetic theories 
of narration, it should be ascertained that the theory which esteems the 
counter-examples to be recognized as such is indeed narratology (one of 
the essential propositions of which, to wit “fictional narrative is the 
discourse of a fictional narrator”, would need to be considered unrefuted). 
To the extent that this programme of work has not yet been carried out, I 
shall conclude by saying that if poetic theories of narration may perhaps 
be refutable by fictional narratives prior to the latter half of the 19th 
century, we cannot yet consider them refuted. 
 
Translated by Susan Nicholls 
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1 A French version of this article is forthcoming in 2012 in Le Français moderne, in a 
special issue entitled “Récits parlés, récits montrés: pour une nouvelle approche des 
fictions en prose sous l‟Ancien Régime”. Cf. Patron (2012). 
2 Cf. for example Genette (1993: 12, 57 and 66); Schaeffer (1994: 56-7 and 2009: 107). 
3 Cf. Schaeffer (1998: 160-161) for a negative answer using the example of Freud‟s case 
histories and, for an opposite view using the same examples, Cohn (1999: 38-57). 
4 Cf. Kuroda (1975: 293, 1979: 11 and 1980: 79), Banfield (1979: 20 and 1992: 479). 
Schaeffer (2009:107) makes the affirmation regarding Hamburger‟s and Banfield‟s 
theories. 
5 Cf. also Schaeffer (1994: 41-42, 1995/1999: 383 and 1999: 266, 268-9). 
6 Even if Schaeffer hesitates, in the final part of his article, between the traditional view 
of the narrator, reserved for first-person fictional narrative, and the narratological view of 
the narrator extended to all fictional narratives. 
7 This presentation takes its inspiration from the presentation of Jakobson‟s theory in 
Ruwet (196-198).  
8 Schaeffer (1998: 163) confuses the author and the narrator from this point of view: “In 
regard to „narrator‟, […] it should simply be considered as a pragmatic presupposition of 
any narrative: until the contrary can be shown, there is no imagining a narrative without 
a narrator; where there is narrative, there just has to be someone who tells it”. Rimmon-
Kenan (3-4) uses formulations which are closer to my own: “Narration can be considered 
as both real and fictional. In the empirical world, the author is the agent responsible fort 
the production of the narrative and for its communication. The empirical process of 
communication, however, is less relevant to the poetics of narrative fiction than its 
counterpart within the text. Within the text, communication involves a fictional narrator 
transmitting a narrative to a fictional narratee”.  
9 Bal (1977: 30-31) at first distinguished between these two types of narratives, but later 
(cf. 1997: 20-25) no longer did so. 
10 Cf., notably, Chatman (234, on the “unreliable narrator”), Cohn (1978:15, on the 
“confessional increment” in first-person fictional narrative, 144-145 and 160), Stanzel 
(89-91 and 93-99), Cohn (1985: 106 and 1999: 60, 126-131). Cf. also Patron (2010 and 
2011).  
11 For the latest postclassical, narratological presentation to date, cf. Meister (339-341).  
The whole of the volume edited by Peter Hühn et al. constitutes a good illustration of 
such persistence. 
12 The opposition between fictional entities and theoretical entities is found in Schaeffer 
(2005: 21-22 and 2009: 101-102), but is not linked to the issue of the narrator in 
narratology. On the latter, cf. Ryan (2010: 58), who offers a localized example of the 
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double standard mentioned. 
13 Cf. also Banfield‟s “Linguistic Competence” (1983: 229). 
14 Kuroda (1973: 383) does not use “first-person story” in its traditional sense (a 
narrative in which a character tells his or her own story, or one in which he or she has 
taken part as a witness, and refers to himself or herself using a first-person pronoun) but 
in the sense of a narrative in which a narrator, who “may or may not be a character in 
the story”, refers to himself or herself using a first-person pronoun. By contrast, Kuroda 
later (1979:10) offers a description of first-person fictional narrative (as “fictional 
autobiography”) which coincides with the traditional description. 
15 “Heterodiegetic narratives with external focalization” in Genette‟s terminology. 
16 “Heterodiegetic narratives with internal focalization” in Genette‟s terminology. It is 
clear that Kuroda‟s linguistic analyses lead to a very different taxonomy from Genette‟s. 
Kuroda and Genette have a common reference, Norman Friedman. Cf. Kuroda (1973: 
383) and Genette (1980: 187-188). 
17 Cf. Genette (1982: 137-143). Cf. also Patron (2011, forthcoming). 
18 The node E designates the initial (non-recursive) symbol of the basic rules in Banfield‟s 
grammar. 
19 This example is cited in Banfield (1982: 72, 94). 
20 The first person interpretable as the SELF of the E refers in the case of free indirect 
discourse to the first person. 
21 This example is cited in Banfield (1987: 273). 
22 “Intradiegetic-homodiegetic narrative” in Genette‟s terminology. 
23 “Extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrative” in Genette‟s terminology. 
24 Hamburger uses “first-person narrative” in its traditional sense: “an autobiographical 
form which reports events and experiences referred to by the first-person narrator” 
(311). She explicitly leaves to one side the case of first-person narrative frames which 
introduce narratives which in fact function as third-person fictional narratives, either 
because the author did not manage to maintain the formal constraint of first-person 
narrative or because the author deliberately chose to play with it. 
25 The sentence is quoted by Banfield in American translation (1978: 297 and 1982: 
185). 
26 Hamburger (1993: 142-175) accounts for third-person fictional narratives with 
authorial intrusions in the context of a study of objectivity and subjectivity in narrative 
(cf. also ib. 337-38). 
27 The elimination of the term “narrator” to designate the author of third-person fictional 
narrative occurs on pages 139-40. 
28 Cf. also 137, where Hamburger presents “the absence of the real I-Origo” and “the 
functional character of fictional narration” as two different formulations of a same fact.  
29 The same idea occurs in Banfield‟s theory of free indirect discourse. 
30 Cf. also Kuroda (1973: 389, 390 and 1976: 133) and Banfield (1982: 211, 219).  
31 Cf. Hamburger (1993: 226) on flashback technique in cinema and the novel. Cf. also 
Banfield (1985: 389, 392, 205 and 210), on iterative frequency in Proust.  
32 Cf. Banfield (1982: 248, 253) and also Galbraith (1995: 49-50), who develops some of 
Banfield‟s intuitions. I have tried to show the benefits to be gained from the distinction in 
analyzing and interpreting one particular fictional narrative. Cf. Patron (2010: 267-270). 
33 Cf. also Schaeffer (2009: 110), who revises some of the propositions expressed in his 
earlier articles and books. 
34 The distinction is expressed very clearly by Schaeffer (1994: 33-34, 41). 
35 Cf. Hamburger (1993: 60-61, 68-70, 89-90, 134-135, etc.). Cf. also Banfield (1982: 
257 et sq.) even though Banfield‟s remarks only concern true, written stories, which use 
the simple past tense in French. 
36 Cf. Hamburger (1993: 81-82, 149, 150, 177-179, 185). Page 150 contradicts Searle‟s 
assertion that Hamburger‟s theory does not account for what he terms “external 
focalization” (which Hamburger herself calls the presentation of characters “from 
without”, in quotation marks in the text). 
